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ABSTRACT
Since independence, intra-Maghrebi relations have been marked by a pattern of
bilateral rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, which has conditioned the
construction of the Maghreb and hampered regional integration initiatives.
This article discusses the impact of political transformations on this
longstanding pattern of behaviour since 2011. While shared perceptions of
threat initially prompted a short-lived ‘defensive détente’ between the two
countries, this rapprochement soon yielded to a new period of rivalry.
Moreover, the sub-regional context in the area is tumultuous, due to the
deterioration of the security situation in Mali and Libya. Once again, the zero-
sum perspective that characterises Moroccan-Algerian relations has prevailed,
preventing both countries from cooperating in tackling regional crises.
Additionally, new arenas of rivalry have emerged in the Sahel, what some
have called the ‘new security border for Europe’ and a space in which both
countries are competing for the roles of stabilising force and regional mediator.
Morocco has taken advantage of the growing interdependence around
security issues between the Sahel and Maghreb after the collapse of the
Libyan state and the instability in Mali to reposition itself as a regional actor
in the Sahel space, challenging Algeria’s traditional role in the region. The
article examines the competition between the two countries to be seen by
the international community as good partners, exporters of security and
stability in the region. The rivalry has been reshaped in two principle areas:
the competition for the role of mediator in the conflicts in Mali and Libya, and
the competition to show expertise in the fight against terrorism and the
processes of religious radicalisation. Finally, the rivalry between the two
countries has extended into the rest of the African continent since Morocco’s
decision to abandon its empty-chair policy and join the African Union.
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Introduction
The anti-authoritarian revolts of 2011 brought about the fall of Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya.
However, their impact in Algeria and Morocco was limited; although the
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protests led to the implementation of some reforms, they did not affect the
power structure (Volpi 2013; Feliu and Izquierdo 2016). This article analyses
the extent to which and how the political changes arising from the 2011
revolts on a sub-regional level affected the traditional pattern of rivalry
between Algeria and Morocco that has structured bilateral relations since
the countries gained independence. The article argues that this pattern of
rivalry has adapted to a region in transformation in which geopolitical div-
isions are becoming less rigid. The growing interdependence with regard to
security between the Maghreb and Sahel (Martinez and Boserup 2017) has
extended the rivalry between the two countries to the region near the
Sahel and the rest of the African continent. The vacuum left in this region
by Libya after the overthrow of Qaddafi and Algeria’s resistance to involving
itself beyond its borders have presented Morocco with an opportunity to push
for proactive diplomacy towards the region. By challenging Algeria’s leader-
ship in its own backyard, Rabat has sought not only to secure enhanced
support for its position regarding Western Sahara, but also to gain some
status as a regional power in Africa in the face of the failure of the Maghrebi
integration project and, finally, to reinforce its role as a stabilising force in the
region in the eyes of the European Union (EU).
The article analyses the rivalry between the countries to take on the role of
regional mediator and lead the search for negotiated solutions in Mali and
Libya, thereby solidifying their image as ‘good partners’ to the international
community. The article also analyses the competition to establish expertise
in the fight against terrorism and the processes of religious radicalisation. In
response to the Algerian model based on the experience acquired during
the 1990s in the country’s fight against Islamist groups, Rabat has proposed
a preventative model based on the dissemination of ‘Islam of the golden
mean’. The third area of the Morocco-Algeria rivalry is related to Morocco’s
decision to return to the African Union and to recover the space it ceded to
Algeria after Morocco withdrew from the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) in 1984.
Methodologically, this empirical study is based on a qualitative analysis of
press releases, speeches and official documents from the Algerian and Moroc-
can Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs and
the official website of the Moroccan government (www.maroc.ma). In
addition, nearly 200 online newspaper pieces were analysed including articles
from Algeria-Watch, al-Watan, Le Matin d’Algérie, El Moudjahid Jeune Afrique, Le
Matin du Sahara, Yabiladi and Tel Quel.
The Algeria-Morocco pattern of rivalry
Since the countries gained independence, intra-Maghrebi relations have been
marked by a pattern of rivalry between Morocco and Algeria. The view of









Algerian-Moroccan relations as a zero sum game connected to the battle for
regional hegemony has not prevented moments of direct confrontation,
including the Sand War of 1963 and skirmishes in Amghala in 1976, the sus-
pension of diplomatic relations from 1976 to 1988 and the closure of the land
border since 1994, all combined with periods of détente (Amirah-Fernández
2004).
A review of the evolution of intra-Maghrebi relations shows how Algeria
and Morocco are more prone to seek détente when the leading elites in
the two countries share a perception of vulnerability in the region. This
occurred, for example, in the late 1980s, when a shared domestic legitimacy
crisis led to a thaw in bilateral relations that were jeopardised by border differ-
ences and the conflict in Western Sahara (Zoubir 2012b). The reconciliation
between the two countries made it possible to relaunch the regional inte-
gration project. The creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) in February
1989 was justified by the need to present a common front in the face of glo-
balisation challenges resulting from the recomposition of the international
system at the end of the Cold War (Hernando de Larramendi 2008).
On the contrary, when the perception of vulnerability has been asymmetri-
cal, the rivalry has tended to intensify. This occurred when it became clear that
the legislative elections in Algeria were going to be won by the Islamic Salva-
tion Front (FIS), unleashing a bloody civil war in that country in 1992. The fear
among Algerians that Morocco would use this moment of weakness to legit-
imise its control over Western Sahara internationally (Hernando de Larra-
mendi 2008) and would support Algerian Islamists in order to destabilise
the regime reactivated the pattern of bilateral rivalry (Belkaïd 2015). Finally,
the land border was closed in August 1994 after the terrorist attack at the
Hotel Atlas Asni in Marrakech, carried out by French citizens of Algerian
origin (Hernando de Larramendi 2012, 93).
The impact of the 2011 anti-authoritarian revolts on Algerian-
Moroccan relations
The wave of pro-democratic mobilisations that crossed North Africa during
2011 once again reinforced the perception of shared vulnerability, producing
a short-lived reactivation of bilateral relations. Mohamed VI’s calls to over-
come ‘sterile antagonisms’ and build a new regional order were accompanied
by improved relations with Algeria (Mohammed VI 2011). As part of this
‘defensive détente’ (Fernández-Molina 2016, 93), Moroccan Foreign Minister
Saadeddine Othmani chose Algiers for his first official visit in January 2012,
nine years after the last visit by a Moroccan minister of Foreign Affairs. The
agreement to create a mechanism for regular political consultations
between heads of ministries from both countries was accompanied by a pro-
liferation of conciliatory declarations that avoided the most conflictive topics









on the bilateral agenda like the Western Sahara question. Examples of this
climate of détente included Rabat’s decision to support Algeria’s candidacy
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and flexibilisation in the Algerian pos-
ition on reopening the land border, a constant demand from Rabat since 2008
(Hernando de Larramendi 2012).
This rapprochement coincided with the appeals made by Tunisian Presi-
dent Moncef Marzouki in February 2012 to advance the construction of a
‘Maghreb of freedoms’. The counter to this voluntarist proposal that wanted
to put democracy front and centre in the regional construction process was
a realistic view that argued for the need to accelerate regional integration
by reinforcing security cooperation in view of the deteriorating situation in
Libya after the death of Qaddafi and the impact of this instability on Mali.
This was reflected in the agreements adopted during the UMA meeting of
foreign affairs ministers held in Rabat in February 2012 on the 23rd anniver-
sary of the creation of the organisation (Arab Maghreb Union 2012).
Reinforcing regional cooperation, however, was limited by the reactiva-
tion of the Algeria-Morocco pattern of rivalry. When the perception of
threat to the Moroccan monarchy decreased, there was a concomitant
decrease in incentives for bilateral dialogue with Algeria, without which
no regional integration project could proceed. The victory of the Islamist
Justice and Development Party (PJD) in the November 2011 legislative elec-
tions and the appointment of PJD Secretary-General Abdelilah Benkirane as
prime minister hastened the decline of the 20 February movement (Desrues
and Fernández-Molina 2013). When the Islamist association Justice and Spiri-
tuality withdrew from the 20 February Movement (which had channelled
the demands to transform the Moroccan regime), it lost a large part of its
ability to mobilise and apply pressure, which, in turn, allowed the monarchy
to limit the concessions it had been forced to make in the earlier context of
vulnerability (Macías Amoretti 2014). Although the 2011 Constitution
opened a window of opportunity to rebalance power by increasing the
powers of the executive branch and limiting those of the king, the coalition
government presided over by the PJD accepted a ‘subordinate cohabitation’
that did not challenge the institutional framework of monarchical power
(Halmi Berrabah 2017).
At the same time, the Algerian regime’s perception of vulnerability also
decreased. When the political and security situation began to worsen in
Egypt, Libya and Syria, the Algerian authorities exploited the memory of the
collective trauma caused by the violence of the 1990s to strengthen their
argument that gradual reforms were preferable to brusque regime changes,
which only produce chaos and instability. Some of the political reforms prom-
ised at the beginning of the revolt period were then postponed, such as the
constitutional reform announced in April 2011 that was not enacted until
2016 (Mañé, Thieux, and Hernando de Larramendi 2016).









As the perception of the ‘pro-democratic threat’ by the Moroccan and
Algerian regimes became less dire, the bilateral rivalry increased and, yet
again, the deteriorating relations were related to Western Sahara. This case
has been at the middle of the rivalry between the two countries since the
Spanish withdrew from the territory in 1976. For Rabat, the Western Sahara
situation is a bilateral dispute since it is only with the logistical, military and
financial support of Algeria that the Sahrawi national liberation movement
Polisario Front has been able to survive. For Algiers, on the other hand, the
question is one of decolonisation and cannot be resolved until the Sahrawi
people are able to exercise their right to self-determination. An early sign of
the return to the Moroccan-Algerian pattern of rivalry appeared in April
2012, when representatives from the Moroccan government left the funeral
of the first president of Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, to protest the presence
of a delegation from the Polisario Front. Behind this gesture lay Morocco’s sus-
picions about the proposal to extend the mandate of the UN Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to human rights monitoring. Rabat
considered this a direct threat to its sovereignty over Western Sahara at a time
when the centre of gravity of the Sahrawi protests had moved inside Western
Sahara from the Tindouf refugee camps. Because of this fear, in April 2012,
Rabat withdrew its confidence in Christopher Ross, the UN special envoy to
Western Sahara, declaring him persona non grata in the autumn of that
year. It also led to the suspension of military manoeuvres with the United
States when Washington presented a draft proposal on the matter to the
Security Council in April 2013. Finally, Morocco recalled its ambassador from
Algiers for consultations in November 2013 after President Bouteflika called
on the African Union to establish a human rights monitoring mechanism in
Western Sahara (Fernández-Molina 2016).
The cooling of relations between the two countries can be measured in
their attitudes about reopening the border. Not only is the border firmly
closed, but a wall is now being built on both sides, justified by the need to
bolster security and impede smuggling and infiltration by terrorist groups.
In July 2014, Morocco announced the construction of a 150-km wall, and
in October, the Algerian authorities approved a plan to dig ditches along
the 6300-km border with its neighbouring countries, including Morocco
(Berriah 2016).
Algerian and Moroccan perceptions of instability in the Sahel
Since 2013, the deterioration in Algerian-Moroccan relations has been
accompanied by the appearance of new arenas of rivalry. In addition to the
Western Sahara question, which continues to be a central element in the
Algeria-Morocco rivalry, new spaces of rivalry have opened up in response
to the increasing instability in Libya and Mali (Ojeda-García, Fernández-









Molina, and Veguilla 2017). Although the security interdependence between
the Sahel and Maghreb poses increasingly transnational threats, the asymme-
trical perception of this situation by Algeria and Morocco has complicated
bilateral cooperation and coordination, making it difficult for the two
countries to collaborate in crisis management, which has turned into
another arena of competition for each country to reinforce its status as
regional power.
Algeria viewed the breakdown of the Malian state and the control of its
immense northern territory – first by the Tuareg rebels from the National
Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and then by the Ansar
Dine Islamists, supported by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – as a
consequence of international intervention in Libya in 2011, which damaged
Algeria’s interests as a regional power (Zoubir 2012a, 455). The uncontrolled
proliferation and circulation of arms from Libya through North Africa and
the Sahel region, along with the return home of hundreds of Tuareg parami-
litaries who had served in Qaddafi’s Islamic Pan-African Legion, were seen by
Algeria as decisive elements in the destabilisation of the region that allowed
the military return of the former coloniser, first in Operation Serval (January
2013) and then in Operation Barkhane (June 2014).
Algeria considers international intervention in Libya a ‘strategic error’ that
spoiled its security focus towards the Sahel, allowing local actors to
implement their own agendas that, in many cases, did not coincide with
Algeria’s interests. The weakening of the client patronage networks woven
in the region by Algerian security services during the two previous decades
deprived Algeria of its main instrument of influence (Martinez and Boserup
2017, 154–156). The permanent destabilisation of the Sahel was seen by
Algeria as a direct threat to its domestic security because of the risk of the ter-
rorist threat spilling over into the country (Mañé, Thieux, and Hernando de
Larramendi 2016, 71–72). This is not just a perception; seven Algerian diplo-
mats were kidnapped in Gao by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in
Western Africa (MUJAO) (Matarese 2012); there were suicide attacks against
military and police installations in Tamanrasset and Ouargla that same year;
and, above all, in January 2013 AQIM carried out a violent terrorist attack
against the gas facility in Tigantourine, whose production at the time of the
attack represented 18% of Algeria’s natural gas exports (Boukhars 2016,
122). Launched in retaliation for Algerian collaboration with Operation
Serval, this attack against the economic heart of the country, which holds
the hydrocarbon reserves, revealed the vulnerability of a region where
social conflict has escalated in recent years (International Crisis Group
2016). As an attack planned in Libya and executed through Mali, it exposed
the risks of having long, porous borders, and convinced the Algerian auth-
orities of the need to reinforce military control along them (Driss-Aït Hama-
douche 2016).









Although the Sahel is viewed by the Algerian authorities as a security belt
(Boutache 2016), Algeria’s ability to ensure its influence in the region is limited
by its longstanding principle of military non-intervention beyond its borders
and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, as stipulated
in the constitution approved in February 2016. The country’s indecision and
refusal to support UN-backed international intervention in Mali also reflected
the conflicting views and interests within the opaque power structure of the
Algerian regime (Ammour 2013, 1). Although the regime authorised in extre-
mis the opening of its airspace to French fighter jets in January 2013 for Oper-
ation Serval, its unwillingness to intervene beyond its borders limited its
options to play a regional leadership role. The country’s attempts to ensure
its influence through a ‘neighbourhood policy’, which would allow horizontal
integration with the Sahel countries with Algeria as a kingpin and protector
(International Crisis Group 2015, 9), conflicted with the country’s national
security doctrine. Shaped by Algeria’s revolutionary past, this doctrine pre-
vents the country from responding to requests for help in the fight against
terrorism beyond its borders. Two examples are the appeals made by the
authorities in the neighbouring countries of Mali in 2012 and Niger in 2013
to help control the terrorist attacks in Agadez and Arlit, respectively (Abba
2016). Algeria’s resistance to assuming the role of regional policeman to
fight illegal immigration and Islamist terrorism has also limited its strategic
options in a regional context where Algeria is being wooed by the Western
powers to act as security provider (Boserup, Martinez, and Holm 2014, 40).
The crisis in Mali, for example, was the focus of the agenda when United
States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Algiers in October 2012, and
during the first visit to the capital in history by a British prime minister,
which was made by David Cameron in January 2013. The deteriorating situ-
ation in Libya and Algeria’s possible support for military intervention in the
country were also on the agenda during visits by the French minister of




In the case of Morocco, the perception of the Sahel is not based on dom-
estic security, but viewed through the lenses of rivalry with Algeria. Rabat sees
Algeria’s attempts to consolidate its hegemony in the Sahel as a threat to its
own attempts to increase its influence in West Africa (International Crisis
Group 2015, 40). Since Mohamed VI came to the throne in 1999, relations
with sub-Saharan Africa have become a new priority for the country’s
foreign policy, as this king wishes to enhance Morocco’s role on the African
continent, extremely weakened in 1984 by Morocco’s decision to withdraw
from the OAU (Fernández-Molina 2013, 594–616). The country’s stated willing-
ness to lead South-South cooperation and act as a ‘bridge’ between Africa and
the EU was made clear in 2000 when the king announced that he was forgiv-
ing the foreign debt of less developed African countries at the EU-Africa









summit. Morocco’s African policy became more active after 2012, when the
country decided to take advantage of the vacuum left by Libya and Algeria’s
diplomatic inactivity. Algeria, in turn, has not been able to adapt to the trans-
formations in the region against the backdrop of an uncertain domestic
context due to the declining health of President Bouteflika, who has not
made a single official visit to the Sahel during his term in office (Benchiba
2017).
The Sahel: a new space for Algeria-Morocco rivalry
Between the Tuareg rebellion and the risk of secession in northern Mali, the
Sahel has become a new space of competition between Algeria and
Morocco. Before the overthrow of Qaddafi in 2011, the Sahel had, above all,
been a space of rivalry between Algeria and Libya (Blin 1990, 354–361),
with both countries competing to be mediators (Lacher 2011, 3). At times,
the countries used their support for armed Tuareg groups in Mali and Niger
as part of a proxy rivalry (Arieff 2014, 15), which led Qaddafi to propose the
creation of a Tuareg federation in 2005 to integrate all of the tribes of the
‘Great Sahara’ (Vallée 2012, 153). The rivalry between the two countries also
became apparent when Algeria chose not to participate in the Community
of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) launched in Tripoli in 1998 (Zoubir
2012b, 92). Coronel Qaddafi’s aspirations to establish Libya as a key player
on the African continent led him to guide the transformation of the OAU
into the African Union with the idea of accelerating unity on the continent
(Haddad 2000).
Invoking the geographic argument that Morocco does not have a direct
border with the Sahel countries, Algeria tried to exclude Rabat from the
various security initiatives implemented in the region after 2001 (Zoubir
2009). This occurred, for example, when Algiers promoted the creation of
the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (CAERT according
to its French acronym) in 2004. Rabat was also excluded from the Tamanras-
set-based Joint Military Staff Committee (CEMOC according to its French
acronym) in 2010. The argument used to leave Rabat out of the Nouakchott
Process launched in March 2013, which included the participation of 11
countries from the Maghreb, Sahel and West Africa, was that Morocco did
not belong to the African Union (International Crisis Group 2015, 11).
Rabat took advantage of the crisis in Mali, however, to reposition itself as a
regional actor in the Sahel. It exploited a window of opportunity created by
the combination of, first, the vacuum left by the collapse of Libya, the only
Maghrebi country with a defined policy towards the Sahel at that time
(Vallée 2012); second, Algeria’s self-imposed limits on becoming militarily
involved outside its borders; and third, the paralysis in Algerian diplomacy
due to the worsening health of President Bouteflika opened a window of









opportunity that Morocco exploited. In 2012, the country endorsed the reac-
tivation of CEN-SAD, which it had joined in 2001 in an attempt to make up for
its absence from African regional forums since the country decided to with-
draw from the OAU in 1984 after the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR) was admitted into it (Nickels 2013). In 2012, Morocco offered military
assistance to the Malian president, Amadou Toumani Touré, after AQIM took
control over the northern part of that country. As a non-permanent member
of the Security Council, Morocco supported international intervention in Mali
in January 2013 (Aït Akdim 2013), and in September of that same year,
Mohamed VI attended the inauguration of new president, Ibrahim Boubacar
Keita, in Bamako, where he signed several agreements regarding economic
cooperation and the training of imams (Tadlaoui 2015). Later in November,
Morocco hosted the 2nd Regional Ministerial Conference on Border Security
in Rabat (Martinez and Boserup 2017, 157) without the participation of
Algeria. The conference activities included the creation of a regional centre
for training border security directors, in an attempt to counterbalance Alger-
ian initiatives to limit the management of the Sahel crisis to the ‘field
countries’ that directly border the Sahel. In March 2014, Morocco participated
in the Flintlock military manoeuvres organised in Niger by the U.S. African
Command (AFRICOM) to improve the military capacity of regional forces in
the fight against terrorist groups and organised crime in the Sahel region
(Jaabouk 2014). Finally, in July 2016, Morocco promised to deliver military
and security materials to Niger to assist the country in the fight against
Boko Haram (Abba 2016). While always keen to raise awareness of the risks
to regional stability inherent in the creation of weak state entities in
Western Sahara and the Tuareg territory in northern Mali, Morocco has
begun to challenge the role used by Algerian diplomacy to consolidate the
country’s regional prestige in the eyes of the EU as a facilitator in the resol-
ution of conflicts and a stabilising force on the new security border (European
External Action Service 2016).
The competition for the role of regional stabilising force and
mediator
The Algerian-Moroccan rivalry in the sub-regional context has materialised in
their competition to be seen as stabilising actors through diplomatic
mediation initiatives. This is one of the roles that both countries have
sought in the past and, in recent years, both have strived to strengthen
their image as ‘good partners’ and security and stability providers. After
Algeria gained independence in 1962 with the assistance of national liber-
ation movements both within and outside Africa, the country enshrined as
normative principles the rejection of the use of force in conflicts, the non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the search for









peaceful, negotiated solutions to crises. These pillars, all highly influenced by
Algeria’s decolonisation experience, became the structural elements for the
foreign policy that underpinned Algeria’s international prestige. Moreover,
the country’s defence of these principles was accompanied by its successful
activity as a mediator in international disputes and conflicts. In 1975, for
instance, Algeria mediated between Iran and Iraq, facilitating the signing of
an agreement on the delimitation of the border between the two countries
(Allouche 1989, 388–390). The diplomatic work done by Algeria was also deci-
sive in negotiating a successful end to the American hostage crisis in Tehran in
1981 (Korany 1991, 146–148; Slim 1992). Algerian representatives were also
involved in the initial mediation process between Iran and Iraq in 1983,
although the conflict between the two countries continued until 1987
(Daguzan 2015, 40).
Morocco, in turn, has used mediation and ‘good offices’ to reinforce its
image as a stabilising force in the Mediterranean region in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. King Hassan II acted as mediator between the Egyptians and Israelis
on the eve of the Camp David Accords signed by the two countries in 1979,
hosted the Arab League summit in 1982 in Fez where the first global peace
plan for the Middle East was approved, and served as an interlocutor
between the Arabs and Israelis, hosting, for example, a visit from Foreign Min-
ister Shimon Peres to Ifrane in 1985 (Hernando de Larramendi 1997). On the
African continent, Morocco’s ability to mediate was impeded during the Cold
War by its alignment with Western interests. This became apparent during the
Shaba crises in 1977 and 1978, when Hassan II played the role of defender of
the values of the ‘free world’. The Western Sahara conflict has also had an
impact on the country’s relations with the continent.1
Algeria’s ability to mediate in sub-Saharan Africa, on the contrary, has been
facilitated by its revolutionary capital (Taleb-Ibrahimi 2013, 387–389). Algiers
used its good offices in the Libya-Chad conflict in 1987 (Grimaud 1984AQ5
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, 414)
and in the border disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 (Shandu
2016), among other conflicts. Although Algeria first became involved in the
Tuareg question in 1962, it was after the Tuareg revolts in the 1990s that
the country intensified its mediation activities between the Tuareg groups
and the Sahel states like Mali and Niger.
Beyond the regional implications, the Algerian regime views the Tuareg
question as an internal issue, since the creation of a Tuareg state would
pose a threat to its national security and territorial integrity (Zoubir 2015,
68). The fear of revolutionary contagion among the Algerian Tuaregs explains
the periodic efforts to mediate between the Tuareg populations in northern
Mali and Bamako during the 1990s. At that time, Algeria defended the
status quo of the borders inherited from the period of colonisation, a principle
included in the OAU founding charter. Algeria’s good offices were decisive in
2006 in negotiating an agreement by which the Mali government promised to









implement a substantial development programme in the northern part of the
country, in exchange for a halt to the rebellion (Mortimer 2015, 14).
When a new rebellion broke out in northern Mali in 2012, it tested Algeria’s
ability to mediate in a region in transformation. The two movements that had
enjoyed Algerian protection in the past, the MLNA and Ansar Dine, joined
forces with AQIM and MUJAO to expel the Malian army from the Azawad pro-
vince. After proclaiming the independence of Azawad, the ‘secular’MLNA was
then expelled from the territory by AQIM, which founded a short-lived ‘Islamic
emirate’. Algeria’s attempts in 2012 to find a peaceful solution to the conflict
were unsuccessful. The country’s strategy was to use Ansar Dine and its head,
Iyad Ag Ghaly – the former leader of the Tuareg revolts in the 1990s who was
well connected to the Algerian authorities – as a proxy in northern Mali
through which to negotiate a solution to the conflict. However, this approach
failed when the group broke the agreement they had signed with the MNLA
in December 2012 under the auspices of Algiers and assumed leadership of
the Islamist offensive against some southern Malian cities, accelerating inter-
national intervention in the country in January 2013 (Ammour 2013, 4).
The French-led Operation Serval highlighted the failure of the strategy of
Algeria, a country highly averse to militarisation of the Sahel by non-African
actors. Morocco then took advantage of Algeria’s inability to reach a peaceful,
negotiated solution and became involved in a crisis that directly affected a key
zone for Algerian security. Rabat pushed for collaboration with the Malian
government, increased bilateral cooperation and, unsuccessfully, tried to
replace Algeria in the northern part of the country (Boitiaux 2014). Morocco
accompanied its outreach to the Malian authorities with an approach to
some of the rebel actors. In its attempt to play facilitator in solving the
crisis, Rabat exploited the MNLA’s decision to distance itself from Algeria
and join forces with the Tuareg movement. Although Morocco had energeti-
cally condemned the unilateral declaration of independence made by this
movement in April 2012 (Al-Quds Al-Arabi 9 April 2014), Mohamed VI received
MNLA Secretary-General Bilal Ag Acherif with honours in Marrakech in January
2014. He was invited to attend prayers with the king at the Koutoubia Mosque
in a symbolic act that the Moroccan authorities used to highlight the historic
ties between the regions, as the mosque had been built by the Almoravid
sultan, Youssef Ibn Tachfin (Aït Akdim 2014). When the MNLA agreed to
replace the demand for independence for Azawad with an appeal for broad
autonomy, Rabat was able to move in and reinforce its mediation skills in
the context of the stalled Ouagadougou Agreements, backed by Burkina
Faso. The reaction from the authorities in Bamako to the rapprochement
between Morocco and the MNLA was negative, which paved the way for
Algerian diplomat Ramtane Lamamra to re-enter the picture and take
charge of the inter-Malian dialogue initiative. The result was the Agreement
for Peace and Reconciliation, signed in 2015 (Chauzal and van Damme









2015, 54). The new closeness between the MNLA and Morocco, however, did
put an additional tool in Rabat’s hands with regard to Algeria, since Morocco
was now in a position to interfere in the Tuareg problem, a question with
direct implications for Algerian domestic security (Martinez and Boserup
2017, 157).
The competition between Algeria and Morocco for the role of regional sta-
bilising force and mediator also played out in Libya after the political crisis in
the country worsened following the June 2014 legislative elections. The exist-
ence of two conflicting Parliaments fighting for institutional legitimacy – one
in Tripoli and the other in Tobruk –, the presence of autonomous armed mili-
tias and the appearance of the Islamic State group in Sirte in October 2014
together generated a situation of widespread civil unrest that the European
states, the United States and the neighbouring countries in North Africa all
watched with apprehension. During the spring of 2015, the UN used the
UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to try to break the deadlock by promot-
ing negotiations between the two Parliaments. Algiers and Rabat competed
to host these negotiations, but in the end Rabat won the right to hold
them in the Moroccan city of Skhirat (Stitou 2015). This choice was deter-
mined in part by the two countries’ different attitudes towards the revolts
and the international intervention that ended Coronel Qaddafi’s regime.
While Algeria had criticised the international intervention led by NATO and
given shelter to part of the Libyan leader’s family, Morocco had supported
intervention and recognised the revolutionary authorities of the National
Transitional Council (CNT) before Algiers (Zoubir 2012b, 91–93; Boukhars
2013).
Since the beginning of the crisis, Algerian diplomacy has defended the
need to find a negotiated solution, organising meetings with Libyan political
leaders before each of the negotiating rounds in Skhirat (Jeune Afrique 2015).
Unlike the rounds in Morocco, where representatives of the Tripoli and Tobruk
Parliaments engaged in indirect discussions through UN Special Representa-
tive Bernardino León, the Algeria-backed negotiations were open to a broader
spectrum of actors, including representatives from the armed militias (Jeune
Afrique 2015). This competition between the two countries was epitomised by
the declarations made by their respective ministers of Foreign Affairs, Sala-
heddine Mezouar and Ramtane Lamamra; each publically expressed their con-
fidence that the successful negotiations were the ones that took place in their
country (Stitou 2015).
Difficulties arose in applying the agreement reached at Skhirat in Decem-
ber 2015, which planned for the creation of a Government of National Accord
headed by Fayez al-Sarraj and power-sharing between the rival Parliaments.
That and a subsequent attack launched from Libyan territory by an armed
branch of the Islamic State group against the Tunisian city of Ben Guerdane
in March 2016 convinced the Algerian authorities of the need to take a









more active role in stabilising Libya, given the growing risks of spillover into
their territory. Since then, Algeria has argued for a consensual modification
of the political agreement reached in Skhirat, promoting an inclusive solution
in which all the parties would participate and that would respect the territorial
integrity of the country (Oukazi 2017). Algiers also believed that the search for
this solution must be led by the countries that have direct borders with Libya.
Consequently, an initiative proposed by Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi in
January 2017 for Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt to work together to find a solution
to the Libyan crisis was well received (Bin Abdullah 2017).
The competition for expertise in the fight against radical
terrorism
The competition between Algeria and Morocco to present themselves as
exporters of security and stability in the region has also influenced the way
they understand the fight against terrorism and the processes of religious
radicalisation.
The experience that the Algerian authorities acquired during their fight
against Islamist groups in the 1990s has allowed the country to claim expertise
in the battle against terrorism since the 2001 World Trade Center attacks in
New York. Presenting the Algerian civil war not as a consequence of the inter-
ruption of the 1992 electoral process, but as an expected large-scale confron-
tation related to the U.S.-led War on Terror, Algeria managed to gain
acceptance as a key actor in security initiatives in the region. The use of this
‘terrorism rent’ (Keenan 2012) allowed the regime to overcome the moral
embargo imposed upon it during the so-called black decade of the 1990s
(Thieux 2008) and participate in regional security initiatives promoted by
the United States like the Pan-Sahel Initiative, later renamed the Trans-
Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative. Algeria believed that the terrorist
groups acting in the Sahel, many of which were made up of Algerians dis-
placed to the south by pressure from the country’s own security forces, are
criminal organisations financed by illicit activities like drug trafficking and kid-
napping and that, therefore, they must be defeated using a police and military
focus. This belief, for instance, lies at the base of the Algerian policy against
paying ransoms for rescues carried out by Western states (Zoubir 2015, 65).
By contrast, without challenging this focus or rejecting the use of security
measures to combat terrorist groups, Morocco sees them and their members
through an ideological prism that is the product of a particular deviated
interpretation of Islam. When the Tuareg Ansar Dine movement aligned
with AQIM in 2012, it gave Rabat the opportunity to frame the conflict in
northern Mali in religious terms. To begin with, Morocco has more symbolic
resources in this sphere than Algeria and, moreover, the overthrow of the
Qaddafi regime left a vacuum in this respect. In his strategy to win influence









in sub-Saharan Africa, Qaddafi had relied on networks created by the Senussi
Brotherhood, founded by the grandfather of King Idris I and, above all, on the
World Islamic Call Society. Endowed with significant financial resources, this
organisation promoted the cultural re-Islamisation of the African states neigh-
bouring Libya by granting scholarships to study at the Al-Da’wa Institute in
Tripoli; financing schools and university departments in neighbouring
countries. (Vallée 2012, 148–152).
The Moroccan king’s status as Amir al-Mu’minin, or ‘commander of the
faithful’, gives the monarch a religious legitimacy that has been regularly
used as a symbolic resource in foreign relations. Hassan II invoked it, for
example, to become president of the Al-Quds Committee at the 1979 Organ-
isation of the Islamic Conference and, later, when he declared his support for
ecumenical dialogue when Pope John Paul II visited Morocco in 1985. In
additional to this religious legitimacy, since the 2003 terrorist attacks in Casa-
blanca, Mohamed VI has presented himself as a champion of a modern Islam
of the ‘golden mean’ (al-wasatiyyah) in contrast to the Wahhabi and Salafist
interpretations disseminated by Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf countries
(Baylocq and Hlaoua 2016). According to this view, the moderate, balanced
version of Moroccan Islam is a combination of an interpretative opening in
the Maliki school of law that predominates in the country, the Ash’ari theolo-
gical doctrine and a deeply-rooted Sufi tradition.2
Morocco portrays this Islam of the ‘golden mean’ as a tool to prevent radi-
calisation and a barrier against increasing terrorism (Fassi Fihri 2015). The crisis
in Mali and the escalation of Jihadist violence in the Sahel have given Morocco
the opportunity to export its model of tolerant Islam to sub-Saharan Africa
along with the experience acquired in reforming and managing religion
(Régragui 2013) as a way to fight the propagation of extremist interpretations.
The first cooperation agreement to share Morocco’s experience with training
imams was signed by Mohamed VI during his visit to Bamako in September
2013 for the inauguration of the new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
(Sakthivel 2014). In a constitutionally secular country (Nievas 2017), the agree-
ment provided for 500 Malian imams ‘devoted to the study of the Maliki rite
and of the moral doctrine that rejects any form of excommunication’
(Mohammed VI 2013) to be trained in Morocco at the Mohamed VI Institute
for the Training of Imams and Preachers created in Rabat in 2015 with a
capacity for 1000 male and female students from a mixture of Arab, African
and European countries (Le Matin, March 27, 2015).
Morocco also promoted the creation of the Foundation for African Ulemas
at Al-Qarawiyyin University in Fez in response to requests received from some
African countries (El Katiri 2015, 25). Inaugurated in 2016, the foundation
answers to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and has 120 theologians, 17 of
whom are women, from 31 countries on the African continent. Their
mission is to coordinate African Muslim scholars’ efforts to generate and









disseminate ideas of tolerance on the basis of Islamic values in opposition to
Jihadist propaganda (Lamlili 2016a). It is also designed to promote ‘security
and stability with regard to the fundamental needs proclaimed in the
Sharia’ (Toufiq 2016). This view was reiterated in the address given by
Mohamed VI at the inauguration of the foundation’s headquarters, when he
said that the institution
through its branches in African countries, and together with other religious insti-
tutions, will play its role in disseminating enlightened religious precepts and in
combating extremism, reclusiveness and terrorism – which our faith does not
embrace in any way – but which are advocated by some clerics, in the name
of Islam (Mohammed VI 2016).
The Moroccan model of a moderate and just Islam has become an effective
soft power tool used to gain influence in its relations with both eastern and
western African countries (Jaabouk 2016a). Morocco has donated copies of
the Koran, provided assistance for the construction or reconstruction of
mosques in Dakar, Dar es Salaam and Conakry (Daoud 2014) and granted
scholarships for theological studies at the Mohamed VI Institute, all to
reinforce the king’s image as a religious leader in Africa. The spiritual ties
that have historically united the sub-Saharan African people to the king of
Morocco as the Amir al-Mu’minin are periodically invoked by Mohamed VI
during his visits to the continent, such as his tour in preparation for Morocco’s




Morocco’s religious diplomacy has also relied on the transnational ties
between followers of the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyyah Sufi brotherhoods. The
Ministry of Religious Affairs presented these ties in the following terms:
Many Sufi schools witnessed wide dissemination across Africa starting from
Morocco. Qadiri and Tijani tariqa-s are the most important and the most wide-
spread; the Qadiri tariqa originated in the Mashriq, but it spread across the
regions of Africa through Morocco. Founded in Fez, the Tijani tariqa spread to
many a region in Africa to the point that its followers were counted by the
millions, all of whose hearts yearned for Fez. They considered their Sheikh Sidi
Ahmed al-Tijani’s swearing allegiance to Sultan Moulay Ismail a binding alle-
giance on the part of his followers to the Sharifian dynasty. They would
address the successive kings of Morocco as ‘Commander of the Faithful.3
This symbolic imagery was initially used by Rabat in its relations with Senegal.
In 1985, the League of Ulemas of Morocco and Senegal was created and soon
filled with, predominantly, followers of the Tijaniyyah (Sambe 2010). This
brotherhood has supported Morocco’s position on Western Sahara and
acted as a parallel diplomatic channel to deactivate bilateral crises such as
the one that took place in 2007 when Rabat recalled its ambassador to
Senegal for consultations in response to declarations made by leaders of









the socialist party in that country about Western Sahara (Sambe 2012, 142).
The open, tolerant nature of Sufi Islam led the president of Nigeria, Ahmed
Bukhari, to request support from the Moroccan leader of the Tijaniyyah to
help combat the Boko Haram terrorist group in November 2016 (Jaabouk
2016b).
By contrast, the Algerian regime, which does not have the symbolic
resources of the Alawite monarchy at its disposal (Papi 2010), competes
with Morocco in this sphere by presenting itself as a model for deradicalisa-
tion, based on the experience acquired by President Bouteflika since he
became president in 1999. The model that Algeria wants to export is
described in the document ‘Algeria and Deradicalisation: An Experience to
Share’ created on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the passage of
the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs/Algeria 2015). This programme was presented by the deputy minister
for Maghrebi and African affairs, Abdelkader Messahel, during the Global
Counterterrorism Forum held in Washington, D.C. in September 2015. For
the Algerian authorities, the success of this strategy is reflected in the low
number of Algerians recruited by organisations like IS, far below that of Tuni-
sians and Moroccans.4 Algeria also maintains dialogue initiatives with radical
Islamists in a half dozen countries (Howe 2015).
The experience that Algeria is eager to share with other countries is a multi-
dimensional model that combines religious, cultural, social, economic and
political measures. Like Morocco, the country has a religious tradition based
on moderation, openness and tolerance. The Algerian strategy argues that
imams and preachers have a role in preventing violent extremism, trying to
lead the fight against religious radicalism through a moderate, peaceful and
tolerant Islam. In January 2013, coinciding with the launch of Operation
Serval in Mali, the country promoted the creation of the League of Ulemas,
Preachers and Imams of the Sahel to serve as a benchmark institution in
the fight against radicalism and violent extremism in the Sahel region (Ali
2013). The League has representatives from Algeria, Mauritania, Mali,
Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad. It periodically organises workshops
on security in collaboration with regional cooperation structures like the
Fusion and Liaison Unit (ULF according to its French acronym). In January
2017, for example, it organised a workshop in the capital of Chad, N’djamena,
on the role of religious leaders from the Sahel in protecting young people
from extremism. Participants included observers from the Ivory Coast,
Senegal and the Republic of Guinea as members of the Nouakchott
Process. In March 2017, the group held its first General Assembly in Algiers
(Ligue des Ulémas 2017).
The Algerian deradicalisation model attributes an important role to Koranic
schools and zawiyas, or religious brotherhoods, as ‘platforms for the dissemi-
nation of positive and constructive ideas and beliefs about Islam [to] form a









bulwark against violent extremism and radicalisation’ (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs/Algeria 2015, 15). The transnational nature of the Tijaniyyah has fomen-
ted competition between Algeria and Morocco to use its networks in different
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. While Morocco supports the Tivaouane
branch, which is mostly in Senegal, Algeria supports the Niass branch,
which is better established in English-speaking Africa. This rivalry has also
moved into the brotherhoods’ symbolic spaces of spiritual affiliation. Algiers
promotes Tijani pilgrimages to the city of the birth of their founder, Ain
Medi, which is on Algerian territory, while Morocco claims that the spiritual
centre of the tariqa is Fez, the city where he is buried (Sambe 2010, 143–145).
Morocco’s return to the African union
Morocco has taken advantage of the new regional context to promote its pol-
icies towards sub-Saharan Africa in order to reinforce its status as a continental
power and recover the space ceded to Algeria since Morocco withdrew from
the OAU in 1984. Strengthening relations with the African continent has been
a priority since Mohamed VI came to the throne in 1999. Reaching this objec-
tive, however, has clashed with a policy that subordinated bilateral
cooperation to the position adopted by each African state regarding
Western Sahara. Because of the backing that the SADR has enjoyed in a
large number of countries in eastern and southern Africa, Morocco’s ability
to implement a continental-wide policy for sub-Saharan countries as a
group has been limited.
The Moroccan decision-making elite began to reconsider this position and
the country’s unsuccessful ‘empty-chair’ policy maintained since it withdrew
from the OAU, as revealed by various reports drafted by think tanks with
links to the royal palace like the Institute Amadeus (2014) and the Institut
Royale des Études Stratégiques (2015). Morocco’s absence from decision-
making bodies, first in the OAU and then in the AU, weakened the country’s
position in Africa, allowing Algeria and other countries with ties to the SADR
like South Africa to steer the OAU’s position regarding Western Sahara.
Morocco was particularly concerned about the appointment of an AU
special envoy for Western Sahara for the first time in the organisation’s
history when, in 2014, former Mozambique president Joaquim Chissano
was named to the post. Known for his pro-Sahrawi positions, it was he who
asked the UN Security Council to set a date for a referendum and for the
MINURSO mandate to be extended to the protection of human rights, while
also denouncing Morocco’s illegal exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural
resources (Armstrong 2017). This pushed Moroccan diplomacy out of its
comfort zone in French-speaking West Africa, forcing the country to seek
relationships with other countries on the continent, regardless of their pos-
ition on Western Sahara.









This realist shift was also seen in Mohamed VI’s decision to return to the AU
in July 2016, expressed in a letter sent to the organisation’s 27th summit being
held in Ruanda. This request was accompanied by a diplomatic offensive
towards sub-Saharan Africa personally led by Mohamed VI who visited 15
African capitals in late 2016 and early 2017 in countries including Ruanda, Tan-
zania, Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger and South Sudan. The country’s objective was
reached four months later when the pan-African organisation approved the
admission of Morocco during the 28th AU summit in Addis Ababa in
January 2017, with the support of 39 of its 54 members, but not Algeria (Her-
nando de Larramendi and Tomé 2017). It is against this backdrop that
Morocco decided in 2017 to improve relations with the countries in eastern
and southern Africa that recognise the SADR, requesting membership in
ECOWAS, an organisation that includes Mali and Niger, countries that
Algeria considers part of its strategic depth. In a speech to the AU, the Moroc-
can king connected this strategic commitment to the African continent to the
failure of the Arab Maghreb Union, ‘the least integrated region in the Africa
continent, if not in the whole world’. (Mohammed VI 2017).
Morocco has relied on two primary tools in its policy towards sub-Saharan
Africa. Along with religious diplomacy, the country has promoted economic
cooperation to strengthen its ties with countries hitherto closer to Algeria.
Using a South-South cooperation logic, Rabat has signed cooperation agree-
ments, has committed to making investments and has challenged Algeria’s
role in the region through large-scale projects in Ethiopia and Niger, countries
that continue to recognise the SADR (Cólogan 2017). The project to construct
a pipeline connecting Nigerian fields with Morocco crossing 12 West African
countries is particularly emblematic. This project replaced an earlier unimple-
mented plan to construct a pipeline to connect Nigerian gas fields to Algeria
through Niger (Tilouine and Bozonnet 2017).
In its policy to reach out to sub-Saharan Africa, Rabat has combined the use
of public resources – establishing the ad-hoc sovereign wealth fund, Ithmar, to
finance projects (Gharbaoui 2016) – with the participation of private compa-
nies to launch development projects. Morocco’s economic penetration in the
continent is viewed with suspicion by the Algerian authorities. With its diplo-
macy revived, Algiers has tried to counter its loss of image and influence by
forgiving the debt of 14 African countries (Arbani 2013) and has encouraged
investment in the continent by private Algerian operators, although such
efforts have been complicated by restrictive laws (Benchiba 2017). The organ-
isation of the first African Investment and Business Forum in Algiers in Decem-
ber 2016 is another example of this approach.
The Morocco-Algeria rivalry also plays out in the arena of image. When
Algeria was accused of implementing a policy of ‘discrimination and violence’
towards sub-Saharan immigrants, Rabat countered by regularising the Afri-
cans who had settled in Morocco. Although the first regularisation in 2014









was limited and questioned by both civil society and human rights defence
organisations, the Moroccan authorities launched a new operation to regular-
ise immigrants in December 2016 that was presented as the antithesis to
Algerian policy at a moment when the country was expelling a thousand
illegal African immigrants (Lamlili 2016b).
Conclusion
This article has examined the impact of political changes stemming from the
2011 Arab Uprisings at the sub-regional level, showing how the pattern of
rivalry that characterisesAlgerian-Moroccan relationshasprevailedwhile adapt-
ing to a tumultuous regional situation. The perception of shared threat in the
face of the pro-democratic revolts that brought down Ben Ali, Mubarak and
Qaddafi initially fostered a ‘defensive détente’ between the Moroccan and
Algerian regimes. When the perception of threat receded, the bilateral rivalry
returned with even more strength, blocking any advance in the Maghrebi
regional integration project. The article has also shown how this rivalry has
extended into the Sahel and other sub-Saharan regions, where Morocco had
been maintaining a low profile since withdrawing from the OAU in 1984.
Notes
1. This did not stop Rabat from acting as mediator between Mauritania and
Senegal in 1989 and in the Mano River conflict between Guinea, Sierra Leone
and Liberia in 2002 (Barre 1995, 43).
2. These three elements are highlighted as conforming Moroccan religious identify
on the Ministry of Religious Affairs website. See http://habous.gov.ma/fr/islam-
au-maroc.html
3. See “Press Release on the Occasion of The Announcement of the Creation of the




4. According to data from December 2015, the number of Algerian combatants in
IS was 200, while there were an estimated 1200–1500 Moroccans and 6000–
7000 Tunisians (Gustafsson 2016).
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